Empirical research documents that an exogenous rise in government purchases in a given country triggers a depreciation of its real exchange rate. This raises an important puzzle, as standard macro theories predict an appreciation of the real exchange rate. We argue that this prediction reflects the assumption that government purchases are unproductive. Using a simple model, we show that the real exchange rate may depreciate in response to a rise in government purchases, if those purchases increase domestic private sector productivity. A very small dose of public sector externality is sufficient to generate this result.
Introduction
A key prediction of standard open-economy models (e.g. Backus et al. (1994) ) is that a country-specific rise in government purchases appreciates the real exchange rate. In those models, a rise in home government spending has a negative wealth effect that induces home households to work harder (which raises home output), and to consume less. The consequent rise in the home marginal utility of consumption has to be accompanied by an appreciation of the home real exchange rate, if consumption risk is efficiently shared internationally.
Much recent empirical research (based on structural vector-autoregressions) has, however, documented that an exogenous increase in government purchases in a given country triggers a depreciation of its real exchange rate (while domestic employment and output increase); see, e.g., Kollmann (1998) , Dellas et al. (2005) , Ravn et al. (2007) and Kim and Roubini (2008) . This raises an important puzzle.
We argue that the real exchange rate appreciation predicted by standard theories reflects the assumption that government purchases are unproductive. Using a simple model, we show that the real exchange rate may depreciate in response to a rise in government purchases, if those purchases increase domestic private sector productivity. Aschauer (1989) , Barro (1990) , Basu (2001) and Bom and Ligthart (2009) stress the productive effects of government purchases. Intuitively, a rise in productive home government purchases triggers a larger increase in home output (than a rise in unproductive purchases). If this supply-side effect is strong enough, then the home terms of trade worsen, and the home real exchange rate depreciates. Our results suggest that a very small dose of public sector externality is sufficient to generate this effect.
The Model

Environment
There are two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F 
The introduction of i G in the production function is motivated by Barro (1990) . Examples of public goods that raise private output include infrastructure facilities, and police protection to enforce property rights. The parameter θ represents the degree of public good externality.
Country i also produces a non-traded final good i Ζ from local and imported intermediate inputs. The final good is used for private and government consumption. i's final-good production function is wage rate. The price of the country i final good is:
Profit maximization by final good firms implies these demand functions for intermediates:
The country i household has utility function
where i C is private consumption. , 0 σ η > are the risk aversion coefficient and the (Frisch) labor supply elasticity, respectively. The household equates her marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure to the real wage rate, / . Before government purchases are realized, the households trade in a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities. In equilibrium, the ratio of Home to Foreign households' marginal utilities of final consumption is hence proportional to the real exchange rate (Kollmann (1991) , Backus and Smith (1993) ):
Model Solution
We assume that the distributions of government purchases are symmetric across countries, and denote mean government purchases by ( ).
i G E G ≡
We linearize the model around the equilibrium that obtains when .
is the relative deviation of a variable x from the point of linearization, .
x Variables without subscripts are ratios of Home to Foreign variables:
(2 1) .
Thus, a Home terms of trade improvement induces a real exchange rate appreciation (as 0.5). When government purchases are productive ( 0) θ > then a rise in (relative) Home government purchases shifts up the (relative) supply schedule of Home intermediates (9), which mitigates the terms of trade improvement. When θ is sufficiently big, this supply effect dominates and the real exchange rate depreciates; specifically, this is the case when (1+η)θ>(2α-1)Γ.
Model calibration
Our calibration closely follows the international macro literature (e.g. Kollmann (1996) ). In typical industrialized economies, government spending and imports are both about 20% of GDP. We thus set 0.2 Γ= and 0.8.
α =
We set the labor supply elasticity, the risk aversion coefficient and the substitution elasticity between domestic and foreign intermediate goods at η =2, 2 σ = and 1.5, φ = respectively; those parameter values are well in the range of empirical parameter estimates, for industrialized countries (see Coeurdacier, Kollmann and Martin (2008) for a detailed justification). For these parameter values, the government purchases externalityθ has to just exceed 0.04 for a rise in government purchase to depreciate the real exchange rate.
The Note--For the values of θ (output elasticity of the public good) listed in Column 1, the Tables reports responses (in %) of the Home real exchange rate (rer), and of relative Home output (y), hours worked (l) and consumption (c), to a shock that increases Home government purchases by 5% (i.e. by 1% of no-shock GDP).
What is an empirically plausible value of the output elasticity of government purchases,θ ?
A considerable literature exists on the estimation of the elasticity of output with respect to public capital. Using a production function approach, Aschauer (1989) estimates this elasticity at about 0.39. Using a meta analysis based on 67 empirical studies, Bom and Lightart (2009) derive an output elasticity of 0.146. In our calibration, the threshold level of θ is only 0.04, which is lower than these empirical estimates. The bottom-line is that for a plausible public sector externality, an increase in government purchase depreciates the real exchange rate.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that a neoclassical model has the potential to explain why (as suggested by empirical research) a rise in government purchases triggers a real exchange rate depreciation. The key ingredient of the model here is the assumption that government purchases raise private sector productivity. A very small dose of public sector externality is sufficient to generate this result.
